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STATEMENT OF SENATOR MIKE MANSFIELD (D. , MONTANA)

FOREIGN AID -- 1961

Mr. President :
Ue are now on the ver ge of a final vote on the foreign aid
program.

The bill, in its present form, is substantially that which

was reported by the Committee.

I think it is a good bill which, i f

it is generally sustained in House, points the way to significant
improvement in the effectiveness of the aid-program and the saving
of public funds on this enterprise in the years ahead.
However, I think we should bear in mind that, with this bill,
we will have merely paved the way.

On other occasions we have

thought that we had set the course for major improvement only to
discover later that little had changed.

In point of foct, the

major action we have taken, that is, the new method of long-range
financing upon which so much of the hope for emendation is based,
affects directly only a segment of the aid-program.

It affects

only loans to other nations which are repayable to us .

I would

caution, therefore, against expecting very much from the change
which we have made in this aspect of the program unless there are
far-reaching changes in other aspects.

Of this aid-authorization,

$1 . 2 billion is involved in the Development Loan Fund.

The diffi-

culties of the aid-program, in the past, have rarely been associated
with loans but rather vdth

~ants

which form the major part of this

$4 billion dollar aid-bill--the part which is not repayable, the
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part for which we shall go on ma.lting annual app:L'opriati<.ms.

The

basic problems of the aid-program, loir . President, go much deeper
than how we may finance lending operations .

They go

l~·gely

to

the grant aspect of this program.
I base this observation, Mr . President, on years of participation in Committee in hearings on Foreign Aid.

I have watched

old spokesmen for the program go and new spokesmen arrive-Republicans and Democrats both.

I have listened to any number of

Presidential messages and debates on this subject.

I have inquired

in depth into the program in special and subcommittee study, as one
Senator trying to do his job .
As the Senate knows, I have been critical of roreign aid
for a long time .

I remain critical.

I remain critical even

though the legislation this year is sponsored by an adminjstration
of my own party.
I remain critical not because improvement cannot flow from
the revisions in the Act which have been engineered by the Committee
on Foreign Relations.

I remain critical because the following coo-

elusion has become steadily more inescapable over the years:

The

Congress can alter this program drastically or abolish it with a
meat-ax but no matter how this Act is drawn or redrawn, legislation
can never provide more than a small part of a discriminating answer

- 2 -

to the diffic.1ltie s of foreign aid.

What matters far more in finding

that kind of answer is how the program is fitted into our foreign
policies and how effective those policies are in the first place.

#hat

matters far more is how the aid-program is carried out in the enormous
detail of administration, day iil and day out, month in and month out,
year in and year out.

In these terms, Mr • .?resident, there is not yet an assurance
of a new approach to foreign aid.

There is not yet an assurance that

foreign aid will be shaped to the purposes of foreign policy rather than
continue as a kind of soporific for our diplomacy.

There is not yet

an assurance that the realistic possibilities of aid will be separated
from the jumble of illusory expectations and that these possibilities
alone will be pursued with vigor and dispatch.

There is not yet an

assurance that the complex, costly, cumbersome over-administration
of the program will be made more effective.

There is not yet assurance on any of these points for the simple
reason that performance alone, not words, can provide such assurance.
And, at this point in a 11ew administration there can only be the words,
the promise that changes -- essential changes -- will De made in foreign
aid, not the performance itself.
in the President's message.

That promise, indeed, is to be found

It is to oe found in the informed efforts

of the Committee on .!Toreign ;;.elations to give the ?resident the kind of
legis l ation which he must have to bring about the essential changes.
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On the basis of that promise, I ir

t

1

to support fully the

legislation which the Committee has reported.

In all frankness, a promise of cnange, alone, might not have
been sufficient to persuade me to this position except in present
circumstances.

Does the Senator from Montana support it, then,

only oecause he happens to be Majority L eader? Is he under some
obligation to s1.1pport it because he ie speaking for the Administration
in the Senate? As the 3enate knows, I have had occasion recently
to speak not as

~1ajority i.....eader

Berlin question.

but as a Senator from Montana, on the

I sho1.1ld not hesitate to speak again in that same

capacity on tt1is matter or any other, if it seemed to me necessary do

do so.
No, M.r. ?resident, I support this measure not beca1.1se I happen
to be Majority weader.

I s.1pport it because I believe an aid-program,

altered in concept and in administration, is vital to the security and
welfare of the nation.

And it should be noted, Mr. President, that the

word, vital, does not appear very frequently in my remarks in the
Senate.

If I am prepared to s1.1pport this program on the promise of change

rather than insisting upon the actuality of chatlge, it is because two
decades of participation have taught me something of the operations
of this government.

Every experienced member of this body knows that

an orderly alteration in an undertaking of the magnitude and complexity

- 4 of the aid-program is not going to be brought abo.1t in six months
or a year.

Tnat is the case no matter how far-sighted or determined

may be the political leadership of this Administration or any other.

The simple truth is that the aid-program which was presented
to .:ongre ss this year is not significantly different in substance from
that of the previous year, despite the change in party shingles on the
door of the ...... xec.J.tive Branch.

It is different only in its promise of

change, and that is the only way in which it can be different at this
time.

The simple tr1.1th is that the preponderant detail of this year's

program was drawn up last year un.der the last Administration and by
essentially the same permanent civil and military officials.

This simple tr1.1th m.1st oe noted, Mr. President, not in criticism
of the previous Administration nor of the incumbent Administration nor
of the permanent f1.1nctionarie s .

This simple truth m1.1st oe noted

beca.1se we must call the cards honestl y if we are to recast the aid
program so that it will indeed serve the interests of the nation more
effectively.

What this simple truth means is that the previous Administration
recognized and the pre sent Administration has confirmed, on an initial
examination of the state of foreign relations, tnat the interests of the
nation in the world require the aid - program to contin1.1e.

- 5 NJ.y own view is that there is a second truttl which we need to recognize.

It is that the aid-program m1.1st continue but in an altered form, as
countless informed critics--many in this body--have noted time arxi
again.

And to these two ooservatioas, I wo1.1ld add a third: The

alterations in the aid-program, if they are to safeguard rather than
disrupt the interests of the nation, can only be promised at this time
of the new Administration.

If they were more than promised, if they

were changes signed, sealed and delivered at this point, the>: would
probably be either insignificant changes or devastating changes.

Believe me, M.r. President, no member of this body is more
convinced than the Senator from Montana- -the Majority L eader- -of
the need for change in the aid-program.

I am not unaware of the high

content of futility, confusion, inertia, waste and worse which has
existed in this program for a long time.

It is understandable that some, seeing these shortcomings, year
after year, are moved to apply this year, the drastic remedy of
abolition.

On this ground, there will undoubtedly be votes cast

against fiaal passage of the bill.

And there will oe others who will see only the expenditure abroad
of three or four billions of the tax-payers money.

fhey will be moved

to opposition on this ground, their opposition deepened oy a scattering
of examples of wasteful or luxurious undertakings in this country or
that abroad, financed by the aid-program.

They will oe appalled and,

- 6 properly so, particularly as they contrast examples of extravagance
abroad with the oacklog of unfilled needs at nome or the deficit in the
budget.

And they, too, will be moved to vote against the oill on final

passage.

fhat, of co1.1rse, is the privilege of every Senator, to vote
against this oill.

In all honesty, lVlr. ? resident, I should like nothing more than
to oe able to tell the citizens of my state and the nation that I had j11st
voted to c11t three or fo1.1r oillions of spending out of the o1.1dget.

:t..ven

more, Mr. President, I should like to be able to tell them that I had
performed this feat without affecting adversely a single F ederal service
to any state.

I co.1ld do that, Mr. Presideni:, if I cast a vote against the
foreign aid bill.

It would not be an •.mtruth.

fraction of the truth.

It wo\lld oe, rather, a

I would not have told the whole story.

I would

have to add, if I wished to tell the whole story, that I had voted to save
these three or four oillion dollars on foreign aid at the gravest risk to
the sec1.1rity of the nation.

I would have to tell them that in voting

against foreign aid, I had also voted to oring about drastic upheavals
in South Korea, in So11th VietNam, in Formosa, in Turkey, in Iran
and .Bolivia and, at least the gravest of political diffic1.1lties in Thailand,
Pakistan, 3pain and Greece and otner nations.

I wo11ld have to tell them
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that I had created a situation whereby there would oe no choice but to
watch many of these situations collapse or to send United States
combat forces into them to try to shore them up.

Nor would that yet oe the whole truth.

I should have to add,

Mr • .Pre sideat, that I had voted for catastrophic economic dislocations
and famine, disease and pestilence in many free nations and, also, for
a world-wide financial panic whose effects would be most acutely felt
in Japan and Western Europe out \\hose repercussions

~

uld reach

even into the United States.

Finally, I would have to tell the citizens of my state and the
nation that I had voted to close American military bases in many parts
of the world and to undermine the whole system of alliances by which,
for a decade or more, we have sought to defend the security of the nation
and to keep open the prospects for freedom in peace in large areas of
the world.

And after having listed all these consequences of my vote against
this oill, I would still have to admit that I had not told quite the whole
story.

A postscript would be necessary.

I would have to say that I

acted to bring about these drastic consequences at a time when a new
Administration was just beginning to grasp the reins of direction over
the sprawling bureaucracy of this government, at a time when this new
Administration was confronted with a whole series of ripening international crises ou.ilding even at this very moment towards an apex at Berlin.

- 8 It might be, iva. P resident, that I would not wish to our den the
citizens of the nation with this long and vexatious account of the consequences of my vote against foreign aid.

It might be that I would find

no point in stuffing them with these troublesome facts of international
life in our times.

In that case, Mr. President, I could save their

time and mine, spare their nerves and mine, if I told them merely
that I had saved them three or four billion by my vote on foreign aid,
and then, did my part for the security of the nation by insisting that
the President use no diplomacy whatsoever but simply stand still at
Berlin and stop the communists wherever they appeared, whether in
L aos , South VietNam, the Gong o or Patagonia.

;!:.x aggeration, Mr. President? I do not think so.

Is there

anyone in this body w .• o does not believe that the most drastic political
consequences would flow from a sudden cessation of grants of aid to
Korea, VietNam, ? ormosa, Turkey, Iran, Bolivia, Thailand, Pakistan,
Spain and C reece? And is the Senate not aware tha t of the total of
$3 billion-odd in grants of military and economic assistance, originally
sought in this legislation by the :t:..xecutive Branch, $1 . 5 billions, was
earmarked for just these te :'l nations while the remainde r of the grants
was scattered in relatively small amounts among mora than 50 other
nations?

I shall not play upon the fears of the Senate by saying that all
these countries will go to the Communists if we do not pass this measure.

- 9 The Senate can be assured, however, that in some instances, it is
no idle fear.

What I do say to the Senate is that these 10 nations,

and a few others are the crux of the grant aspect of this program.

It

is these nations which have devel oped a direct and heavy dependence
upon American aid.

It is these nations which would be affected to

their very vitals by sudden termination of the program.

What I do

say to the Senate is that the entire position of these nations and their
relationship with the United States would u.ndergo a sudden and
incalculable change if this bill were not passed.

What kind of make- believe world are we living in if we can lead
ourselves to believe that the situation, at least in the 10 nations I have
enumerated, would not alter virtually overnight and our relations with
them turn upside down if we were to withdraw the king-pin of aid?
And what is a vote against this bill but a vote to withdraw the king-pin?

Some will see clearly these consequences.

But they will assert

that it is better to face the collapse of the situations and other worldwide repercussions rather than to go on with this unsatisfactory device
of aid and the continued drain on our resources which it entails.
I respect the honesty of that position, Mr. -=>resident, but I most
respectfully disagree with it.

I disagree with it oecause I do not

believe this nation can long anchor its life of f:-eedom and plenty in a
vast sea of hopeless human misery, political chaos and deepening
tyranny.

In the wor ld which we now know, Mr. President, a world

- 10 J:.JJ' vn."r.h ~ ~
rstill either allied with us, friendl

in which the

or,

at worst, indifferent, we are compelled to military expenditures

be, Nlr. Prasident, in a world in which the greater part were allied
elsewhere, hostile or, at best, indifferent? E-ighty percent of the
budget? 90

per~nt?

$60 billions?

How many billions, then, for defense, Mr. President,

$70 billions? $80 billions?

Living day in and day out

in a military camp, mobilized at constant readiness for an attack
upon us, how far would we ourselves have moved from freedom?

And

what, then, of the spending in Washington? Spending . not for the
unemployed or for the aged or for schools or for roads or for the
coun~le ss

other human needs of this nation;

bu~

spending for the

dubious privilege of maintaining an uncertain footho l d on the edge
of a hostile world?

No, Mr . President, I cannot see that the answer to the patent

shortcomings of the aid- program lies in the drastic surge r y of total
excision.

I cannot see it, for I see as the only alternative in pre sent

international circumstances something approaching a garrison State
in this nation.

If there is any other alternative, it seems to me that

it is a responsibility on the part of those who advocate this remedy
to enlighten those of us who do not.

May I say that I can understand the concern of some Members
who are persuaded to this solution of abolition of aid.

I share the
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concern without endorsing the solution.

And I stress to the Senate

that there are grounds, enormous grounds for concern in the manner
in which the aid-program has unfolded in recent years.

Who in this body should not feel concern when in country after
country, after years of this program since the Marshall Plan, grar.ts
of aid from this nation remain the critical factor in maintaining
internal stability, and the end of this process is not yet in sight?
We use words loosely, Mr. President, if we call this condition by
any name other than a form of dependency.

And it is not in the

interests of this nation or freedom that any other nation remain
indefinitely in a state of dependency on aid- grants from the United
3tate s.

It is not in the interests of the peoples of the recipient nations.

Who in this body should not feel concern when hundreds of
millions of aid goes to governments which have not met or are
unwilling to meet honest tests of public acceptance in their own
countries? Who in this body should not feel concern when the gap
between the luxurious life of the few in and around governments and
the poverty- striken life of the millions in aid- receiving nations does
not begin to close and, all too frequently, the beneficial impact of
the bulk of our assistance is limited to the few?

Who in this body should not feel concern at the manner in
which the military aid program has developed? In theory, military
aid ought to be bound up directly with our own defense needs.

At least,
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it began that way, Mr. ?resident.

It oegan with what seems to me

to have been a reasonable strategic relationship with free nations
involved in the defense of the Atlantic region, and with certain key
countries elsewhere--a total of perhaps 15 or 20 nations at the
outside.

.au t military aid during the last few years has sprawled into

aln:t 50 nations and, often, brought in its wake the need for

massive infusions of economic grants to support military e stablis.hments, built and sustained by military aid.

It has sprawled in, with

all the costly trappings of bureaucracy and it has immersed us
inevitably in the internal affairs of nation after nation whose
connection with our military defense is often vague or non-existent.

F rom a concept of close strategic relationship with our defense,
military aid has now moved to an enlarged base of justification which
equates the maintenance of internal stability in nations almost everywhere on the globe with our security.

That, Mr. President, in my

opinion, is a most dangerous doctrine, particularly in nations where
the gross and long- standing neglect of human needs has created
situations of inevitable and massive internal instability.

We must ask, Mr. President: Is this intelligent strategy or
is it simply Parkinson's law with a vengeance?

Is any member of

this body familiar with even one government which, having requested
military aid, was refused it on the grounds that there was no clear
connection with our defense? Surely, Mr. President, there must be

- 13 one nation somewhere in this world which seeks military aid but
whose relationship to our defense is so remote that it does not
warrant the expenditure of millions of dollars of tax-payers' fund
for equipping its armed forces.

V'!e must ask, Mr. President: Have we underwritten our own

security by this process? Or have we undermined our security by
a wholesale and indiscriminate commitment of the prestige and
resources of this nation in this obscure land or that which may
come within the eager reach of bureaucracy?

fhese questions should indeed bring concern in the Senate.
They give striking cause for concern when we consider them, specifically, in connection with the situation in Laos.

I have some first-

hand familiarity with that situation, Mr. ?resident.

I was there when

in 1953 there were only two American officials in the entire country.
I watched the haphazard wholesale bureaucratic involvement, not of
one agency but of several, deepen over the years.
again against this course.

I urged time and

But the bureaucracy grew and the millions

of dollars in grants multiplied in 1955, '56, '57, '58, '59 and '60.
growth helped to tighten the noose around an effective policy.

fhis

It helped

to smother the possibility of a sensible diplomacy of limited contact with
this remote situation by involving this nation ever more deeply in
Laotian internal affairs.

We gave Laotian leaders labels--some

correct, some incorrect--and then became obsessed with the labels we
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gave them.

And now, seven years later, after the steady flow of

thousands of civilian and military officials, after the parade of
private contractors building this or that at millions of dollars of
cost, after the pilgrimage of inspectors, consultants and what-not,
more than three-hundred-and-fifty millions of dollars of the taxmoney of the American people later, we are back to diplomacy in
Geneva in an effort to find a solution to this situation which has
become far more difficult to deal with than it was when the involvement
began.

And should the 3enate not be concerned, Mr. President, by
the events in Korea?

Can we feel anything else but concern when we

recall the great sacrifices of Americans, Koreans and others to keep
South ho rea free and see now where we have arrived? It is eight years
after these great human losses culminated in the truce in 1953.

It is

$4 billion dollars in grants after the truce in South Korea.

What has been wrought by this immense effort, Mr. President?
We must ask that question.
the rug.

We can no longer sweep the doubts under

We cannot take umbrage in shifting the responsibility

elsewhere.

For if there is any area in the world where our influence,

the influence of the aid-program has been immense and overwhelming
it has oeen South Korea during the last 7 or 8 years.

We know what was achieved by the conflict, Mr. President;
the hope of freedom was kept alive in South Korea.

But what has been
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done with the years since this achievement?

What has been wrought, Mr. President, out of the billions
of aid since the truce?

We must ask that question, even though the

::ommuaists are poised across the border at the 38th parallel. It
is no answer to say that in a critical situation of this kind or in
Laos or in others, the less said the better and then go on in the
same pattern.

VTe cannot accept silence on these burning questions.

We cannot ignore these matters any longer.

rhere are grave risks, Mr. President, in speaking out at a
time of confrontation with the Gommunists in horea no less than
elsewhere, but the gravest risk of all is to find in this confrontation
an excuse for not examining and correcting our own shortcomings.

Korea has revealed a dangerous pattern into which the aidprocess is interwoven in certain underdeveloped nations.

The pattern,

is this, Mr. President: poverty and want--instability--Communist
or other pressures--U.S. aid--puolic corruption--weak civilian
government- -the response of military dictator ship.

The pattern is stark and clear in Korea but its applicability is
by no means confined to that buffeted nation.

V'.'e will ignore the

implications of that pattern only at our own peril, only at great cost
in wasted aid, only at the risk of repeated blows to the stature, the
dignity and ultimately the safety of this nation.

I say to this Senate,

- 16 that if the only answer that freedom can give to comm..tnism is the
dead- end of military J ...mta then we have given no answer at all.

And

it borders on the disgraceful to suggest in the land of the Declaration
of lndepe nde.'lce , and the Sonstitution, in a land which fought through
World War II, without doing violence to the rights of its citizens,
that this is the only answer which can be given.

For a moment in historic time, the last-ditch device of military
dictatorship may give a respite from ooth the threat of communism
and frustration with the complexities of freedom but t he tide of history
will not wait much longer

~han

that moment.

No matter how grim the

circumstances, we will either divorce ourselves from or change
this pattexn, of which the aid-program has become an interwoven
element, or we will face the gravest of consequences in the years
ahead.

The answer to communism is responsible freedom and not

some other form of tyranny in the name of anti - communism or any
other ism.

If we are to use the device of foreign aid at all, we

ha~

better see to it that those who administer it understand that elementary
truth.

Let me make clear, Mr. President, that I do not mean every
nation receiving aid must reproduce the forms of freedom which have
evolved in this nation or Vl e stern Europe.

But there are certain funda-

mentals of freedom which cannot be ignored without robbing the word of
its meaning.

There must be the expressed consent of those governed and

- 17 the right of peaceful dissent.

There must be respect and safeguards

for the dignity of th=-_ human personality.

Where these do not exist,

freedom does not exist, and in these situations, the aid-program treads
on dangerous grounds, particularly in its massive military and economic
aspects, regardless of how worthy may be its objectives.

Mr.

,~.:>resident,

I could go on in this vein, citing case after

case for concern with the aid-program.

I could note this road-project

or that, crumpling in some obscure country a year or two after millions
were spent to complete it.

I could refer to evidences of unbridled

incompetence or extravagance, of improper practices, of expensive
experts piled on expensive experts-- scurrying Dack and forth and
producing unused reports flowing in an endless stream to files and
storage warehouse , of any number of other specific and expensive
faults.

Errors of this kind can be made in foreign aid, Mr. President,
some excusable, some inexcusable.

I daresay that in this respect,

the agency which administers the aid-program has not been mucn
different than a score of others and under far more difficult circumstances.
But these errors, Mr. ?resident, do not go to the heart of the matter
as it confronts the Senate.

The heart of the matter is that foreign aid cannot be terminated
abr1.1ptly without producing the most catastrophic consequences for this
nation.

And the heart of the matter, too, is that foreign aid must change
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or, in the end it may still produce catastropnic consequences for
this nation.

Time is running out, Mr. President, in which to convert this
program into ai

certain asset for freedom and for the security of

this nation.

It seems to me that we shall have a better chance, perhaps a
last chance, to bring about this conversion if we grasp, now, at the
beginning of a new Administration, some of the lines of essential
alteration.

Indeed, changes of this nature are suggested in the

.?resident's message and the (;ommittee' s report.

If I may s1.1mmarize

and elaborate, I would s1.1gge st that the revision of this program needs
be built on these premises:

(1) Aid Grants- -as distinct from loans or Point IV technical
assistance- -ought to be most carefully used as a direct supplement
of our foreign policies.

v{e must seek constantly, through diplomatic

initiatives, the adjustment of this nation's role in and relations with
changing and evolving parts of the world, adjustments which will
permit a reduction in grants of military aad economic aid, without
jeopardizing peace or security.

We m1.1st not rest content with any

existing situation whose stability is heavily dependent on the indefinite
continuance of this form of assistance from the United States.
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(2) Military aid must shrink in orderly fashion until it
becomes again what it was originally intended to be, a direct ard
vital strategic link in the military defense of this nation.

Except

in these terms, it seems to me that this program rests on most
tenuous grounds.

We must, indeed, question whether it is in our

interests or in the interests of the people of recipient countries if this
aid serves only vaguely as a link in our defense and very specifically
as an instrument for promoting internal stability in other lands.

In short, what I am suggesting, M r. President, is that we must
actively discourage, not encourage, other governments from seeking
or depending upon military aid from this nation.

This aid should be

extended with the greatest reluctance and caution and not with an

eagerness~plunge this nation into the internal affairs of others.
1 know there is risk in this course.

rhis country or that may fall

to a government which is :;ommunist or otherwise antagonistic towards
ue.

But it ought to be clear by now ui!!{ .fsk remaino even if we do

supply military aid, as witness

~uba,

Viet Nam, and L aos.

Governments which do not meet the reasonable needs of their
peoples cannot long endure.

If they fall, the consequences to this

nation, are likely to be far more adverse in those countries which
have been supplied with significant military aid than in those which have
not.
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(3) Where we are deeply immersed in supplying grants of
economic or supportin g aid of one kind or another, year i n and year
out, we must act to reduce and end this dependeo.cy, not in a day, not
in a year but as rapidly as possible,

This is partly the task of

creative diplomacy, as I have already indicated.

But it is also

the task of a wise, dedicated and indefatigable administration of
the aid- program itself, with the ooj ect of ending the dependency.
We must develop, together with recipient nations, clear-cut, finate
and definable objectives for grants of aid.

We must insist upon

sacrifices on the part of those wao can make them h1 t he recipient
nations, sacrifices which match those of our own peopl e who foot
the bill for aid.

We must develop plans of action which induce an

ever-increasing imput of initiative and effort on the part of recipients
and a steady reduction in aid- grants on the part of thisf nation.

(4)

We must re-examine the present complex of what are the

small and essentially altr uistic expressions of the aid-program, namely,
our large contributions to the total funds fo r the United Nations
technical assistance and related activities, the ?oint IV Technical
Assistance Program and the new Peace Corps concept.

All of t hese

efforts have great merit in themselves but one would hope , Mr. P r esident,
that we shall make certain tnat we use to best advantage the tens of
millions of dollars that flow through these separate channels in terms
of maximum advantage to the nations into which they flow and, in terms
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of long-range goodwill.

If there is one part of the aid-program which

should act to kindle warm, iluman, friendly contact between the
people of this nation and people elsewhere, it is this type of activity.

(5) In our own interests as well as in the interestsof peace we
must encourage and

welcome the widest possible international

participation in assisting underdeveloped nations to move forward
more rapidly in economic and social progress.

We are trying to do

that, of course, with respect to Western Europe.

But there is room

for more giving in some of the nations of that region.

Indeed there

is room for more giving on the part of nations everywhere.

In this connection, it sho1.1ld be noted that there was a time,
not very long ago, when the mere prospect of 3oviet assistance to
non - communist countries was viewed as little short of disastrous on the
part of those who administered our own aid- affairs.

The Congress was

spurred to appropriations for the aid- program on the grounds that we
had to compete with the Russians in this process.
have given aid to India.

Yet the .Russians

They have given aid to Egypt and elswhere

and the world has not collapsed in any of these places.

Indeed, there

seems to be even a measure of correlation between the presence of Soviet
aid-administrators in, and the improvement of our relations with,
certain nations in A sia and Africa.

It seems to me utterly essential that the people of this nation not
be pressured into larger appropriations for the aid-program by this
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tactic .

The tactic not only undoes much of the intrinsic worth of

the program by giving it a motivation which is transparent even to
children, out it places this nation in the position of being presured
into ever larger grants of aid.

We must do what must be done in foreign aid, not on the basis
of a competition with the Soviet Union to see who can get there first
with the most wide - open hand.

We must do what must be done on the

basis of what reasonaoly serves the interests of the people of this
nation and the people of recipient nations, what serves freedom and
peace.

Other nations must act as they see fit.

If they believe it

really serves their interests to accept Soviet aid and they get it, I see
no cause for panic on our part.

These observations would seem to oe so elementary as not to
require discussion in the 3enate.

Yet, it is evident that much that is

elementary needs discussing if t his program is to be improved.

(6) Finally, Mr. President, grants of military and economic
aid, partic..1larly, must be administered as instruments of foreign
relations on the basis of policies determined first and last by the
?resident and the Secretary of State.

Jur diplomacy must be free to,

and must be spurred to seek to reduce the need for this aid.

It must

cease to serve as a kind of spearhead or errand boy for the introduction
of this type of assistance into more and more nations.

- 23 Within the administrative structure of the aid program itself
there must be a complete overhaul of concepts, techniques, and, if
necessary, of personnel in order to make certain that the program
does become a controlled instrument of policy in fact as well as in
words.

And, finally, if aid is to be an effective instrument, there

must be a vast simplification and streamlining of the administrative
processes themselves.

Mr. President, in my opinion, changes along these basic lines
must be achieved and they must be achieved promptly.
is at stake.
stake.

0ur security

.:>ur stature as a responsible and prudent nation is at

Prevention of the waste of enormous amounts of public funds

is at stake.
I 1-L . }

Some may inquire, then, why should the >enate not, aCW!nOW to
save more of these funds by cutting the authorization reported by
the ::ommittee? And indeed, why should the Senate

no~~ocee~

on the Floor to write into law these oasic changes which I have been
discussing?

I revert to what I said at the outset of my remarks.

satisfied, Mr. President,

lam

~~tfe Foreign .<elations .::::ommittee

has done with this bill constitutes what can be prudently and wisely
done by legislative action at this time.

I would not hesitate to accept

the combined judgment of that group of men against any other, including
the past or pre sent administrators of this program, as to what
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legislation will be most useful.

Their year-in, year-cut consideration

o f this measure has given them an understan d ing an d k now l e d ge Of

al.d v.J-JVf/)7tJ~
j

which is unexcelled in this body or in this government.

The balance of the task of alteration, as I see it, Mr. President,
must be carried out by the President and the Administration.

With

a new President and a new Administration, the opportunity for constructive change does exist.

rhe president is prepared and determined

to do the job that must be done.

It is essential that he have every

reasonable opportunity to do it.

If Senators--regardless of party--

desire that this program be altered, as, clearly, it must be altered, if
Senators de sire that significant amounts of public funds be saved in
the years ahead, V\4. thout jeopardy to the nation's security and interests,
they will support this bil~ a:s= if" h.es~x !£!!:::!-r9HECennniU&&..-

Mr. President, I have spoken, today, at great length and with
the utmost frankness.

I hope that in doing so I have not given personal

offense to anyone in the Senate, the Administration or in friendly nations
abroad.

Certainly that

was not my intention.

But there comes a time,

Mr. President, when it is necessary to risk misunderstanding in order
to further a greater understanding. when facing facts must take precedent
over saving face.
program.

That time, I believe, is now, for the foreign aid

